Wittgenstein on Democracy
| Democratic societies are today confronted with a challenge
that they fail to grasp. One of the main reasons for this incapacity lies in the kind of political theory
that is dominant today. Liberal-democracy is mainly based on 'rationality', and can only supply answers to
'rational' questions. It is ample time, when we want to continue the advantages of democracy, to leave the
'rational' framework and to begin thinking about life in a paradigm way. At the age of 19 Wittgenstein moved from Austria to England. Instead of becoming an aeronautical engineer (as planned) he studied the foundations of mathematics under Bertrand Russell. Soon after start of the world war I he became soldier on the side of the Germans. In the trenches he started his dissertation, and finished it in 1922 in an Italian prison camp. It was his only work published during his lifetime. The name was Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, and became very influential in especially circles of logical positivists. Wittgenstein himself soon left this line of thought, to become a relativist. His other masterwork Philosophical Investigations is therefore much more open. |
Action
Reading Wittgenstein while forgetting his preoccupation with language is meeting a very original thinker. But he is not only original, surprisingly enough also very practical. It is undeniable, that seeing any language as a basis for views on our world leads to deep insights. Exactly in this way Nietzsche also came to very original views.
Democratic action according to Wittgenstein, is not acting based on some fundamental truth but on all kind of practices and pragmatic moves aimed at consensus, trying to build an ever more balanced or shockproof society.
The crucial idea of Wittgenstein in this field is asserting to agree on the language used, before agreeing in opinions. That’s something else the agreeing upon English as means of communication, it is consensus about the meaning of certain English words. For instance what is meant by ‘democracy’.
Wittgenstein alerts us to the fact that agreements in opinions are in fact agreements in forms of life. As written by him: So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false. It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in forms of life.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958): Philosophical Investigations I,241. Oxford: BlackwellRoom for Obedience
Present times show a growing disaffection towards democracy, but generally accept it as the best system. It is vital to understand that democratic values and institutions are made by action rather then by sophisticated rational arguments that declare war by making truth claims. The game is about identification with democratic values and this is a complex process.
As already claimed: for Wittgenstein agreement is established not on opinions but on forms of life. The result is another life form and not a product of reason. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and a heretic. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969): On Certainty. London, 204. Then the fool tries to persuade the heretic, or vice versa.
Following a rule, writes Wittgenstein, is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right? Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958): Philosophical Investigations I,206. Oxford: Blackwell. This is indeed crucial for democratic theory. There only is a rational solution if you presume a difference in opinion. But this solution is a sort of war, with only one real victor.
Accept that ‘obeying the rule’ can be done in different ways without ‘going against it’. So room is needed.
Conclusion
Accepting different truths for different perceptions of the world in fact is the very condition of existence of democracy in a multi-cultural world. Creating consensus in such a world won’t be done without conflict, and ‘clashes’ are inevitable. But these struggles will not be one between ‘enemies’ but among ‘adversaries’, since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones.